

INVESTIGATIVE INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Project Name:

SIERRA DAO





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Project Name: **Sierra DAO**Blockchain: **Avalanche**

Token (If Applicable): Sierra \$SRA

Token Contract Address:

0x862D2E466C28dB7961E953083854e19481478842

Quantity of Responsible Parties w/ Identification on

File with Assure DeFi LLC: 1

Nationality of Responsible Parties: United States

Date Investigation Was Opened: **2/08/22**

Alleged Scam/Fraud Type: **Fraud, Rugpull**

CONTACT INFORMATION FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT TO OBTAIN KYC & IDENTITY DETAIL INFORMATION ON FILE WITH ASSURE DEFI:

Direct Contact

Email: chapo@assureteam.io

Twitter DM: www.twitter.com/el_crypto_chapo/ Telegram DM: https://t.me/el_crypto_chapo/ Mailing Address
Assure DeFi LLC
c/o United States Corporation Agents, Inc

411 Wolf Ledges Parkway, Suite 201 Akron, OH 44311

Estimate of Injured Parties:

~300

Estimate Funds Stolen:

~\$160,000

Last Known Location of Funds:

Coinbase, Kucoin, Self-Custody Wallet(s)

*See details below in BlockChain Forensics/Funds Tracing Section of Report.



BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Sierra DAO promised to be a decentralized reserve currency building carbon neutral protocols, financial frameworks, cross-chain DAOs, decentralized banking, dWeb browsing. The project was a fork of the Olympus (OHM) project with protocol-owned liquidity.

A presale was held to fund the initial liquidity for the project. From the screenshot below, a total of 1,079,109 MIM (Avalanche Network Stablelcoin pegged to \$1 USD) was contributed by presale buyers.




The project was launched on 1/6/22 and traded live for ~24 days until the project owner made the decision to shut it down. The reasons cited for abandoning the project were the overall poor market conditions, the poor performance of the project in its first month & lack of momentum that would be difficult to regain.

It was stated that token holders would be compensated by distributing all available protocol-owned funds remaining back to the token holders on a weighted basis before abandoning the project.

On February 2nd, the project owner for Sierra DAO contacted Assure DeFi with the statement shown below. This statement indicates that all funds were returned to token holders.

Once we realised the project was dead we gave every cent back we had left in the protocol

-SierraDAO Admin



Statement to Assure DeFi 2/2/22

TIMELINE OF EVENTS

There were two separate "baskets" of protocol-owned funds at the time the project was abandoned. As per the project description and the information provided to investors, both the treasury & the liquidity pool were protocol-owned.

Treasury Funds:

https://snowtrace.io/address/0x8ea7233267098746341391 6019e598040a8537af

Liquidity Funds:

https://snowtrace.io/token/0xcac0101426fdbfcfe7baff17d dc6652d92540480

*Trader Joe LP Tokens, Comprised of SRA + MIM (Avalanche Network)

On Jan-07-2022 07:06:52 PM +UTC

The following address **0xf2017eb301ce7d992fa5c79d820ce1eaf024d835** was **added** as a managing address for the **SierraDAO Treasury contract**. It was initiated by the **SierraDAO treasury contract** deployer.

pushManagement(0xf2017eb301ce7d992fa5c79d820ce1eaf024d835)

Note that a possible "rug pull" functionality can be observed in the Treasury Contract's source code:

```
409 -
         function manage(address _token, uint _amount) external {
410 -
            if (isLiquidityToken[_token]) {
411
                 require(isLiquidityManager[msg.sender], "Not approved");
412 +
             } else {
413
                 require(isReserveManager[msg.sender], "Not approved");
414
415
416
             uint value = valueOf(_token, _amount);
             require(value <= excessReserves(), "Insufficient reserves");
417
418
419
             totalReserves = totalReserves.sub(value);
420
             emit ReservesUpdated(totalReserves);
421
422
             IERC20(_token).safeTransfer(msg.sender, _amount);
423
424
             emit ReservesManaged(_token, _amount);
425
         }
```

Treasury Contract's Source Code

TIMELINE OF EVENTS

Continued

The funds were transferred from the treasury **0x8eA72332670987463413916019e598040A8537Af** in three transactions.

Jan-30-2022 06:41:49 PM +UTC

230,000 MIM 0x896ab73518e4ad932d91dd0c76c6d8080a20d976a4208970 d2cb6c79affe23f9

Jan-30-2022 06:48:00 PM +UTC

16,000 MIM 0x9629261ae54106f98582b4dec79e37ca6ea5a3f13dff385151 d707fe8c3662bb

Jan-30-2022 06:53:37 PM +UTC

4.58 JLP 0xd7975dca26f2c1473f2cfc44bd40c6740aff5967a6f5412c50c 4f1532d203842

These transactions called the **manage()** function in the Treasury Contract mentioned above.

After that **GnosisSafeProxy** contract made the following transactions:

Feb-07-2022 03:17:43 AM +UTC

10,320 MIM 0x57516721a8408b705a034cbf809ea0fd8aa77513310e1d813 334d6e13c23a070

Feb-01-2022 05:46:23 PM +UTC


235,680 MIM 0x769340fea76c049035d2ad19aced2e1676ebe88ddde5d28d 5810d59c012a6957

Jan-30-2022 06:55:51 PM +UTC

4.58 JLP 0x585b44ae2673a3fca9b028e51ed17bd79958de9cb49b15fe2 eb84c7717dcc2bc

MIM tokens from Transaction#2 were eventually redistributed amongst some of the Sierra (SRA) token holders.

https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x7e91c529f7d690dd60f8e88ae0857 64b8d4c64887cfe37925802bcb50a506342



Note:

This distribution above has not been fully analyzed to determine if it was done appropriately, ensuring that all outstanding token holders received compensation. There are reports that some token holders which had SRA tokens staked received no compensation at all. Further analysis may need completed to compare snapshot of token holders + stakers against the distribution list to see who was compensated & the amounts which were distributed.

Transactions #1 and **#3** were transferring **MIM** and **JLP** tokens to the following address: 0xa06aba69adb309fa1a8fa786fb63377b3207a8c0

Important Note: This address is the creator of the **GnosisSafeProxy contract** and is also the creator of the **Sierra Token (SRA) pre-sale contract.**

This would indicate that the funds from Transaction #1 & #3 above were sent to a wallet controlled by the dev/project owner.

BLOCKCHAIN FORENSICS/FUNDS TRACING

After receiving the **JLP** tokens, <u>0xa06aba69adb309fa1a8fa786fb63377b3207a8c0</u> removed the liquidity with the following <u>transaction</u>, resulting in getting **148,910 MIM** tokens. The funds were <u>swapped</u> to **145,546 USDC.**

Then, **80,000 USDC** were **swapped** to the **Ethereum network**, and **29,000 USDC** were **transferred** to **0xf82ac87c63f55bf2f02feef42bdf6f2dd72dc577**.

Those funds were also **swapped** to the **Ethereum network.**

Here are the further transactions done by 0xa06aba69adb309fa1a8fa786fb63377b3207a8c0:

AVALANCHE (AVAX) NETWORK

- 1) 14500 USDC swapped to the Ethereum network.
- 2) 200 USDC swapped to Ethereum network
- 3) 21846 USDC swapped to Ethereum network
- 4) 1,417 USDC sent to 0x998f5804a14a7302c628bd2e20fed6c2564c5c6d
- 5) 10320 MIM <u>swapped</u> to 10297 USDC
- 6) 10297 USDC swapped to Ethereum network

ETHEREUM (ETH) NETWORK

- 1) 79954 USDC swapped to 31 ETH
- **2) 1100 USDC sent** to **0xc1ef4499c560a612f270fe1ea2b205a4d656d992**, which **ended up** on Coinbase
- **3)** 14463 USDC <u>sent</u> to 0x4d7606ab77035aa1d1976bd9a2061579ced2f73a, which <u>ended up</u> on Coinbase
- **4) 100 USDC sent** to **0x39def1ceeb0f828b7219f63bd1d8e946316d29e4**, which **ended up** on Coinbase
- 5) 5000 USDC sent to 0x401969c54e45fb91f17b7c491cf1214c574f3f4b
- 6) 23493 USDC sent to 0x401969c54e45fb91f17b7c491cf1214c574f3f4b
- 7) 10260 USDC sent to 0x401969c54e45fb91f17b7c491cf1214c574f3f4b

Assets from **Transactions #5, #6 and #7** were **sent** to **0x738cf6903e6c4e699d1c2dd9ab8b67fcdb3121ea**, which is believed to be a **KuCoin** hot wallet address.

- 8) Mutant Ape Yacht Club NFT bought for 25 ETH
- 9) 3.15 ETH sent to a Coinbase address
- 10) 2.3 ETH sent to a (possibly) KuCoin address

SUMMARY/CONCLUSION

When the project was dissolved, all available treasury funds appear to have been distributed. This distribution may not have been done appropriately, as there are multiple claims from token holders of not receiving anything from this distribution. It appears as though some stakers, holders of sSRA, may not have been compensated at all.

The value of the protocol-owned liquidity was not distributed back to token holders at all. Instead, it appears that the liquidity was removed and funds were sent to personal private wallets controlled by the dev/project owner.

The protocol-owned funds which were transferred to the personal wallets have been bridged, withdrawn to centralized exchanges & also used to purchase other assets such as NFT's.



RECOMMENDED ACTION ITEMS/NEXT STEPS FOR ADVERSELY AFFECTED PARTIES

Contact Coinbase Support with details of the alleged fraudulent activity and request that the account the stolen funds have been withdrawn to be frozen immediately (Priority)

Reference the following transactions to Coinbase that are associated with this event:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x8db4a09cab15c2e5a6bf35e321c64f00db0a1eaa10380b7881b8a5f9ac6ec662 https://etherscan.io/tx/0xd3e6c3c21e07268c632a47e4b6b0b477087c2dffa0a732a64b1e28f75688c421 https://etherscan.io/tx/0xb458952db901cccddbf47dd591ea5c23de14d8d3deda1589862c0dde70f79012

Contact Kucoin Support with details of the alleged fraudulent activity and request that the account the stolen funds have been withdrawn to be frozen immediately (Priority)

Reference the following transactions that are suspected to have been transferred to a Kucoin-owned wallet that are associated with this event:

https://etherscan.io/tx/0x3ffca350d96ff4bbac2ccab362db9c6c21cd42f06b5959888b879f4d3f519b4e https://etherscan.io/tx/0x7d18389608694d4054ee0626f8f0d45c3645e714539ed4d94b196a80e3aaaa4b https://etherscan.io/tx/0x99998e194f800b49510289936b049e1e583079f3e249ced0849d3a18290c73f0

File law enforcement reports with the following agencies:

#1: Federal Trade Commission | http://www.reportfraud.ftc.gov/

#2: Commodity Futures Trading Commission | http://www.cftc.gov/Complaint

#3: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission | https://www.sec.gov/tcr



NEXT STEPS FOR ASSURE

- Assure will provide guidance on additional appropriate jurisdictions & agencies to which injured parties can file reports as applicable.
- Fully cooperate with law enforcement agencies upon official requests as received

RESOURCES

If you have additional information related to this case, please submit via Assure DeFi's scam reporting form using the following link:

https://www.assuredefi.io/scam-reporting-form

Contact Assure DeFi directly via the following channels:

Twitter Direct Message:

www.twitter.com/assuredefi/ Email: chapo@assuredefi.io

